draft-nsdt-teas-transport-slice-definition-02.txt | draft-nsdt-teas-transport-slice-definition-02-isolation-changes2.txt | |||
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skipping to change at page 1, line 15 | skipping to change at page 1, line 15 | |||
Intended status: Informational S. Homma | Intended status: Informational S. Homma | |||
Expires: October 23, 2020 NTT | Expires: October 23, 2020 NTT | |||
K. Makhijani | K. Makhijani | |||
Futurewei | Futurewei | |||
LM. Contreras | LM. Contreras | |||
Telefonica | Telefonica | |||
April 21, 2020 | April 21, 2020 | |||
IETF Definition of Transport Slice | IETF Definition of Transport Slice | |||
draft-nsdt-teas-transport-slice-definition-02 | draft-nsdt-teas-transport-slice-definition-02 | |||
+ Suggested changes by Jari Arkko | ||||
for resolving isolation-related comments from Joel Halpern. | ||||
Approach #2, | ||||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
This document describes the definition of a slice in the transport | This document describes the definition of a slice in the transport | |||
networks and its characteristics. The purpose here is to bring | networks and its characteristics. The purpose here is to bring | |||
clarity and a common understanding of the transport slice concept and | clarity and a common understanding of the transport slice concept and | |||
describe related terms and their meaning. It explains how transport | describe related terms and their meaning. It explains how transport | |||
slices can be used in end to end network slices, or independently. | slices can be used in end to end network slices, or independently. | |||
Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
skipping to change at page 5, line 34 | skipping to change at page 8, line ? | |||
backup or duplicate resources such as path (same SLOs - latency, | backup or duplicate resources such as path (same SLOs - latency, | |||
bandwidth, etc.), network functions (same compute, memory, etc.) | bandwidth, etc.), network functions (same compute, memory, etc.) | |||
To meet no packet loss objective, packet replication maybe | To meet no packet loss objective, packet replication maybe | |||
necessary to guarantee that at least packets from one path was | necessary to guarantee that at least packets from one path was | |||
achieved. However, we should consider this as 'how' aspect of | achieved. However, we should consider this as 'how' aspect of | |||
objective and not 'what'. | objective and not 'what'. | |||
o Security: The objective of securing a transport slice concern with | o Security: The objective of securing a transport slice concern with | |||
three attributes: a) end-to-end encryption between source and | three attributes: a) end-to-end encryption between source and | |||
destination endpoints, this can be seen as the logical link | destination endpoints, this can be seen as the logical link | |||
between source and destination end points requiring encryption, b) | between source and destination end points requiring encryption and b) | |||
Authentication and access control (ACLs) objectives to permit data | Authentication and access control (ACLs) objectives to permit data | |||
on this transport slice, c) Isolation, is also a characteristic of | on this transport slice. The definition of transport slice itself | |||
security, to prevent interference between two or more slices or | implies logical partitioning to keep traffic separate between | |||
other flows on the same infrastructure. Isolation is implied by | different slices, but without a promise of encryption or other | |||
the definition of transport slice itself (logical | mechanisms. | |||
partitioning...). | ||||
o Resolution of guarantee: The above objectives can be resolved in | o Expected confidence level to be able to satisfy a | |||
to either hard or soft guarantees. A hard guarantee is the one | "guarantee". This confidence level should be expressed | |||
that is not affected by other traffic. In a soft guarantee, a | separately for each different characteristic listed above. | |||
violation (of the guarantee) may occur in rare cases due to | ||||
resource interference. In such cases, the guarantee will be | ||||
maintained by the network controller within a certain tolerance | ||||
level of that objective. Note that a hard guarantee does not | ||||
prevent from hardware failures, such as losing a node. Additional | ||||
protection against such issues is possible, by specifying those | ||||
characteristics separately (see item "resource redundancy" below). | ||||
Note also that the hard and soft guarantees do not say anything | Note that no guarantee can prevent hardware failures, such as | |||
losing a node. Additional protection against such issues is | ||||
possible, by specifying those characteristics separately (see | ||||
item "resource redundancy" above). | ||||
Note also that the confidence does not say anything | ||||
about the specific implementation of how these guarantees are | about the specific implementation of how these guarantees are | |||
achieved. Different implementations might use different | achieved. Different implementations might use different | |||
techniques, from avoiding oversubsription to dedicating particular | techniques, from avoiding oversubsription to dedicating particular | |||
links or their virtual fractions to particular transport slices. | links or their virtual fractions to particular transport slices. | |||
o Resource isolation: In some cases it may be necessary to dedicate | For further discussion on this, see also Appendix A. | |||
specific resources to the slice, for instance, for security | ||||
reasons. | ||||
o etc. | o etc. | |||
The framework [I-D.nsdt-teas-ns-framework] may further specify | The framework [I-D.nsdt-teas-ns-framework] may further specify | |||
mechanisms for the performance, assurance and monitoring of these | mechanisms for the performance, assurance and monitoring of these | |||
objectives. | objectives. | |||
Note: Additional objectives may be necessary to capture, such as | Note: Additional objectives may be necessary to capture, such as | |||
specifying well defined paths or domains that a slice may transit. A | specifying well defined paths or domains that a slice may transit. A | |||
transport slice carries multiple flows between the 2 endpoints, | transport slice carries multiple flows between the 2 endpoints, | |||
skipping to change at page 6, line 42 | skipping to change at page 8, line ? | |||
instead of SLA is used even though SLAs are more commonly used term | instead of SLA is used even though SLAs are more commonly used term | |||
by the operators. SLOs are definitive and measurable parameters | by the operators. SLOs are definitive and measurable parameters | |||
associated with a service, therefore, network resource and | associated with a service, therefore, network resource and | |||
connectivity requirements are defined accurately. In contrast, | connectivity requirements are defined accurately. In contrast, | |||
service level agreements represent contracts for a service between a | service level agreements represent contracts for a service between a | |||
service provider and a service consumer (or subscriber). Providers | service provider and a service consumer (or subscriber). Providers | |||
then translate SLA into SLO; these translations vary from one service | then translate SLA into SLO; these translations vary from one service | |||
provider to the other. Therefore, all through within the scope of | provider to the other. Therefore, all through within the scope of | |||
transport slices term SLO will be used. | transport slices term SLO will be used. | |||
4.1.1. Isolation discussion | ||||
Due to overloading of the term, a further discussion is added to | ||||
highlight two aspects of isolation, first the resolution of isolation | ||||
of an objective (as described above) and second, the dedicated use or | ||||
a hard-separation perspective of the resource. | ||||
Providing a hard resolution of guarantee for the characteristics of a | ||||
transport slice means that the behavior and performance of other | ||||
transport slices should not impact that slice, even if they run over | ||||
the same underlying infrastructure or use logically shared network | ||||
resources. | ||||
In the context of soft resolution of guarantees, since the transport | ||||
slices are logically partitioned over the shared resources, a certain | ||||
degree of commitment to the guarantee is expected even when it is not | ||||
hard. When the shared resource pools begin to become saturated, SLO | ||||
violations can happen, however, impacting only the performance or | ||||
operation of service associated with the transport slice. | ||||
This degree of isolation can be derived from availability | ||||
characteristics requested, such as whether a hard or soft guarantee | ||||
was requested. Requesting a hard guarantee may commit more resources | ||||
than would be required for a softer limit. | ||||
In addition, resource isolation may be applied to ensure dedicated | ||||
access to a particular node, for instance. In such requests a | ||||
dedicated allocation to a link, node and/or other resources to create | ||||
a transport slice for a particular service. For example, a mission- | ||||
critical service may ask for a dedicated router and/or a link or port | ||||
for complete isolation from other services. | ||||
When realizing a transport slice, a network controller should be | ||||
responsible for allocating and providing resources according to the | ||||
specified objectives. | ||||
SLO violations can occur for two reasons and corresponding statements | ||||
apply | ||||
o Shared resource interference: i.e. multiple transport slices | ||||
simultaneously share the same resource, and one of them consume | ||||
the resource in surplus. If the SLO guarantees are strictly | ||||
required, then the network controller can be informed of this by | ||||
requesting a hard guarantee. Note that the terms hard and soft | ||||
limit are requirement oriented and different from what is | ||||
specified in, [I-D.ietf-teas-enhanced-vpn]). | ||||
o Resource failure or fault occurs, such as a link or node failure. | ||||
Where it is important to defend against these, the relevant | ||||
characteristics on resource redundancy (and perhaps some other | ||||
characteristics on restoration speed and other factors) need to be | ||||
specified. | ||||
* Restoration isolation: the network is not impacted for a period | ||||
longer than the given time. For example, failover or the | ||||
service restoration takes no longer than some number of | ||||
seconds. This is specified by Availability SLO. | ||||
* Protection isolation: the network path is protected with | ||||
specified backup path. This is specified by Availability SLO. | ||||
4.2. Endpoint Variation | 4.2. Endpoint Variation | |||
Transport slice endpoints are the terminating or originating nodes | Transport slice endpoints are the terminating or originating nodes | |||
requiring connectivity with specific SLO. Endpoints may be devices | requiring connectivity with specific SLO. Endpoints may be devices | |||
or functions. | or functions. | |||
4.2.1. Types of Endpoints | 4.2.1. Types of Endpoints | |||
There are two types of endpoints based on the functions they perform. | There are two types of endpoints based on the functions they perform. | |||
skipping to change at line 804 | skipping to change at line 741 | |||
Kiran Makhijani | Kiran Makhijani | |||
Futurewei | Futurewei | |||
USA | USA | |||
Email: kiranm@futurewei.com | Email: kiranm@futurewei.com | |||
Luis M. Contreras | Luis M. Contreras | |||
Telefonica | Telefonica | |||
Spain | Spain | |||
Email: luismiguel.contrerasmurillo@telefonica.com | Email: luismiguel.contrerasmurillo@telefonica.com | |||
Appendix A: Making Guarantees | ||||
Due to this complex topic and the use of number of different | ||||
approaches and terms in the industry, this appendix attempts to | ||||
describe some of the issues surrounding making guarantees. | ||||
It should be noted first that absolute guarantees cannot be made, | ||||
because in the end there can be situations where (for instance) all | ||||
nodes fail, preventing service to be offered. There are also a large | ||||
number of factors affecting failures, from common power source to | ||||
common software implementation prone to the same failures, to the | ||||
simpler cable cuts and node failures. The set of dependencies between | ||||
different a slice and the components it needs to function is complex. | ||||
There are also dependencies between different slices, even when some | ||||
of their resources (such as the links they use) are separated. | ||||
Nevertheless, reasonable proclamations of the likelihood of | ||||
failures can be provided, based on the specific techniques used in | ||||
a specific realisation of a slice. For instance, using redudant | ||||
paths and redundant nodes many errors can be eliminated. | ||||
This document does not attempt to classify different implementation | ||||
techniques, and as such, the only requirement is to be able to specify | ||||
and commit to the "reasonable likelihood" of a failure in some rational | ||||
way. | ||||
This reasonable likelihood is also going to be dependent on what | ||||
characteristic is being guaranteed, for instance latency may be more | ||||
prone to fluctuations than bandwidth, if there's contention to a link | ||||
but buffer space is plentiful. | ||||
Some general categories of such likelihoods can be given, however. | ||||
A failure to respect a guarantee can be due to a failure or the | ||||
traffic situation, but it should be noted that this is not simply | ||||
a question of (for instance) separate links not affecting each other. | ||||
Two entirely different traffic flows may affect each other, e.g., | ||||
due to overload of some management or control function. | ||||
We define three terms: | ||||
Shared resource contention: i.e. multiple transport slices | ||||
simultaneously consume the same resource, in amounts greater | ||||
than what is available. | ||||
Disjoint resource interference (also known as the "surprisingly | ||||
shared resource contention"): i.e. multiple transport slices depend | ||||
on resources whose fate is affected by each other, e.g., due to | ||||
control plane interaction. | ||||
Component interference: Multiple transport slices depend on the | ||||
same components or design, e.g., piece of software. | ||||
Nertheless, the impact of traffic on guarantees is something that | ||||
at the base level can be calculated through traffic models and | ||||
the network configuration. There's a clear difference to being | ||||
able to provide the full link bandwidth almost always vs. only | ||||
during the non-busy hours of the day. | ||||
The effect of failures and more complex interactions is more | ||||
difficult to model, and caution should be paid when attempting | ||||
to provide too simplistic, "this will never fail" type guarantees. | ||||
End of changes. 8 change blocks. | ||||
81 lines changed or deleted | 18 lines changed or added | |||
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