draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-10.txt   draft-ietf-core-dev-urn.txt 
Network Working Group J. Arkko Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track C. Jennings Intended status: Standards Track C. Jennings
Expires: July 17, 2021 Cisco Expires: August 27, 2021 Cisco
Z. Shelby Z. Shelby
ARM ARM
January 13, 2021 February 23, 2021
Uniform Resource Names for Device Identifiers Uniform Resource Names for Device Identifiers
draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-10 draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-11
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) namespace This document describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) namespace
for hardware device identifiers. A general representation of device for hardware device identifiers. A general representation of device
identity can be useful in many applications, such as in sensor data identity can be useful in many applications, such as in sensor data
streams and storage, or equipment inventories. A URN-based streams and storage, or equipment inventories. A URN-based
representation can be passed along in applications that need the representation can be passed along in applications that need the
information. information.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2. Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DEV URN Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. DEV URN Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Character Case and URN-Equivalence . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1. Character Case and URN-Equivalence . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Security and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Security and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.6. Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.7. Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.8. Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Revision Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9. Revision Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. DEV URN Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. DEV URN Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. MAC Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. MAC Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. 1-Wire Device Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. 1-Wire Device Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Organization-Defined Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Organization-Defined Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Organization Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Organization Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Organization Product and Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . 10 4.5. Organization Product and Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6. Future Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.6. Future Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.2. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Changes from Previous Version . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix A. Changes from Previous Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) [RFC8141] This document describes a new Uniform Resource Name (URN) [RFC8141]
namespace for hardware device identifiers. A general representation namespace for hardware device identifiers. A general representation
of device identity can be useful in many applications, such as in of device identity can be useful in many applications, such as in
sensor data streams and storage [RFC8428], or equipment inventories sensor data streams and storage [RFC8428], or equipment inventories
[RFC7252], [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]. [RFC7252], [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].
A URN-based representation can be passed along in applications that A URN-based representation can be passed along in applications that
need the information. It fits particularly well for protocols need the information. It fits particularly well for protocols
mechanisms that are designed to carry URNs [RFC7230], [RFC7540], mechanisms that are designed to carry URNs [RFC7230], [RFC7540],
[RFC3261], [RFC7252]. Finally, URNs can also be easily carried and [RFC3261], [RFC7252]. Finally, URNs can also be easily carried and
stored in formats such as XML [W3C.REC-xml-19980210] or JSON stored in formats such as XML [W3C.REC-xml-19980210], JSON [RFC8259]
[RFC8259] [RFC8428]. Using URNs in these formats is often preferable or SenML [RFC8428]. Using URNs in these formats is often preferable
as they are universally recognized and self-describing, and therefore as they are universally recognized and self-describing, and therefore
avoid the need for agreeing to interpret an octet string as a avoid the need for agreeing to interpret an octet string as a
specific form of a MAC address, for instance. Passing URNs may specific form of a MAC address, for instance. Passing URNs may
consume additional bytes compared to, for instance, passing 4-byte consume additional bytes compared to, for instance, passing 4-byte
binary IPv4 addresses, but offers some flexibility in return. binary IPv4 addresses, but offers some flexibility in return.
This document defines identifier URN types for situations where no This document defines identifier URN types for situations where no
such convenient type already exists. For instance, [RFC6920] defines such convenient type already exists. For instance, [RFC6920] defines
cryptographic identifiers, [RFC7254] defines International Mobile cryptographic identifiers, [RFC7254] defines International Mobile
station Equipment Identity (IMEI) identifiers for use with 3GPP station Equipment Identity (IMEI) identifiers for use with 3GPP
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(MEID) identifiers for use with 3GPP2 cellular systems. Those URN (MEID) identifiers for use with 3GPP2 cellular systems. Those URN
types should be employed when such identifiers are transported; this types should be employed when such identifiers are transported; this
document does not redefine these identifiers in any way. document does not redefine these identifiers in any way.
Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URNs [RFC4122] are another Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URNs [RFC4122] are another
alternative way for representing device identifiers, and already alternative way for representing device identifiers, and already
support MAC addresses as one type of an identifier. However, UUIDs support MAC addresses as one type of an identifier. However, UUIDs
can be inconvenient in environments where it is important that the can be inconvenient in environments where it is important that the
identifiers are as simple as possible and where additional identifiers are as simple as possible and where additional
requirements on stable storage, real-time clocks, and identifier requirements on stable storage, real-time clocks, and identifier
length can be prohibitive. UUID-based identifiers are recommended length can be prohibitive. Often, UUID-based identifiers are
for all general purpose uses when MAC addresses are available as preferred for general purpose uses instead of MAC-based device URNs
identifiers. The device URN defined in this document is recommended defined in this document. The device URNs are recommended for
for constrained environments. constrained environments.
Future device identifier types can extend the device URN type defined Future device identifier types can extend the device URN type defined
here, or define their own URNs. here (see Section 7), or define their own URNs.
Note that long-term stable unique identifiers are problematic for Note that long-term stable unique identifiers are problematic for
privacy reasons and should be used with care as described in privacy reasons and should be used with care as described in
[RFC7721]. [RFC7721].
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section 3 defines The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section 3 defines
the "DEV" URN type, and Section 4 defines subtypes for IEEE MAC-48, the "DEV" URN type, and Section 4 defines subtypes for IEEE MAC-48,
EUI-48 and EUI-64 addresses and 1-Wire device identifiers. Section 5 EUI-48 and EUI-64 addresses and 1-Wire device identifiers. Section 5
gives examples. Section 6 discusses the security and privacy gives examples. Section 6 discusses the security and privacy
considerations of the new URN type. Finally, Section 7 specifies the considerations of the new URN type. Finally, Section 7 specifies the
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part of the IETF-provided basic URN types, covering identifiers that part of the IETF-provided basic URN types, covering identifiers that
have previously not been possible to use in URNs. have previously not been possible to use in URNs.
3.2. Syntax 3.2. Syntax
Syntax: The identifier is expressed in ASCII characters and has a Syntax: The identifier is expressed in ASCII characters and has a
hierarchical structure as follows: hierarchical structure as follows:
devurn = "urn:dev:" body componentpart devurn = "urn:dev:" body componentpart
body = macbody / owbody / orgbody / osbody / opsbody / otherbody body = macbody / owbody / orgbody / osbody / opsbody / otherbody
macbody = %s "mac:" hexstring macbody = %s"mac:" hexstring
owbody = %s "ow:" hexstring owbody = %s"ow:" hexstring
orgbody = %s "org:" posnumber "-" identifier *( ":" identifier ) orgbody = %s"org:" posnumber "-" identifier *( ":" identifier )
osbody = %s "os:" posnumber "-" serial *( ":" identifier ) osbody = %s"os:" posnumber "-" serial *( ":" identifier )
opsbody = %s "ops:" posnumber "-" product "-" serial *( ":" identifier ) opsbody = %s"ops:" posnumber "-" product "-" serial *( ":" identifier )
otherbody = subtype ":" identifier *( ":" identifier ) otherbody = subtype ":" identifier *( ":" identifier )
subtype = LALPHA *(DIGIT / LALPHA) subtype = LALPHA *(DIGIT / LALPHA)
identifier = 1*devunreserved identifier = 1*devunreserved
identifiernodash = 1*devunreservednodash identifiernodash = 1*devunreservednodash
product = identifiernodash product = identifiernodash
serial = identifier serial = identifier
componentpart = *( "_" identifier ) componentpart = *( "_" identifier )
devunreservednodash = ALPHA / DIGIT / "." devunreservednodash = ALPHA / DIGIT / "."
devunreserved = devunreservednodash / "-" devunreserved = devunreservednodash / "-"
hexstring = 1*(hexdigit hexdigit) hexstring = 1*(hexdigit hexdigit)
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Device identifiers are generally expected to identify a unique Device identifiers are generally expected to identify a unique
device, barring the accidental issue of multiple devices with the device, barring the accidental issue of multiple devices with the
same identifiers. In many cases, device identifiers can also be same identifiers. In many cases, device identifiers can also be
changed by users, or sometimes assigned in an algorithmic or local changed by users, or sometimes assigned in an algorithmic or local
fashion. Any potential conflicts arising from such assignments are fashion. Any potential conflicts arising from such assignments are
not something that the DEV URNs as such manage; they simply are there not something that the DEV URNs as such manage; they simply are there
to refer to a particular identifier. And of course, a single device to refer to a particular identifier. And of course, a single device
may (and often does) have multiple identifiers, e.g., identifiers may (and often does) have multiple identifiers, e.g., identifiers
associated with different link technologies it supports. associated with different link technologies it supports.
The DEV URN type SHOULD only be used for persistent identifiers, such The DEV URN type SHOULD only be used for hardware-based identifiers
as hardware-based identifiers. that are expected to be persistent (with some limits, as discussed
above).
3.4. Security and Privacy 3.4. Security and Privacy
Security and Privacy: As discussed in Section 6, care must be taken Security and Privacy: As discussed in Section 6, care must be taken
in the use of device-identifier-based identifiers due to their nature in the use of device-identifier-based identifiers due to their nature
as long-term identifiers that are not normally changeable. Leakage as long-term identifiers that are not normally changeable. Leakage
of these identifiers outside systems where their use is justified of these identifiers outside systems where their use is justified
should be controlled. should be controlled.
3.5. Interoperability 3.5. Interoperability
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assigned by that organization. assigned by that organization.
In the DEV URN "mac" subtype the hexstring is simply the full EUI-64 In the DEV URN "mac" subtype the hexstring is simply the full EUI-64
identifier represented as a hexadecimal string. It is always exactly identifier represented as a hexadecimal string. It is always exactly
16 characters long. 16 characters long.
MAC-48 and EUI-48 identifiers are also supported by the same DEV URN MAC-48 and EUI-48 identifiers are also supported by the same DEV URN
subtype. To convert a MAC-48 address to an EUI-64 identifier, The subtype. To convert a MAC-48 address to an EUI-64 identifier, The
OUI of the MAC-48 address (the first three octets) becomes the OUI of the MAC-48 address (the first three octets) becomes the
organization identifier of the EUI-64 (the first three octets). The organization identifier of the EUI-64 (the first three octets). The
fourth and fifth octets of the EUI are set to the fixed value FFFF fourth and fifth octets of the EUI are set to the fixed value 0xffff
hexadecimal. The last three octets of the MAC-48 address become the (hexadecimal). The last three octets of the MAC-48 address become
last three octets of the EUI-64. The same process is used to convert the last three octets of the EUI-64. The same process is used to
an EUI-48 identifier, but the fixed value FFFE is used instead. convert an EUI-48 identifier, but the fixed value 0xfffe is used
instead.
Identifier assignment for all of these identifiers rests within the Identifier assignment for all of these identifiers rests within the
IEEE Registration Authority. IEEE Registration Authority.
Note that where randomized MAC addresses are used, the resulting DEV
URNs cannot be expected to have uniqueness, as discussed in
Section 3.3.
4.2. 1-Wire Device Identifiers 4.2. 1-Wire Device Identifiers
The 1-Wire* system is a device communications bus system designed by The 1-Wire* system is a device communications bus system designed by
Dallas Semiconductor Corporation. 1-Wire devices are identified by a Dallas Semiconductor Corporation. 1-Wire devices are identified by a
64-bit identifier that consists of 8 bit family code, 48 bit 64-bit identifier that consists of 8 bit family code, 48 bit
identifier unique within a family, and 8 bit CRC code [OW]. identifier unique within a family, and 8 bit CRC code [OW].
*) 1-Wire is a registered trademark. *) 1-Wire is a registered trademark.
In DEV URNs with the "ow" subtype the hexstring is a representation In DEV URNs with the "ow" subtype the hexstring is a representation
of the full 64 bit identifier as a hexadecimal string. It is always of the full 64-bit identifier as a hexadecimal string. It is always
exactly 16 characters long. Note that the last two characters exactly 16 characters long. Note that the last two characters
represent the 8-bit CRC code. Implementations MAY check the validity represent the 8-bit CRC code. Implementations MAY check the validity
of this code. of this code.
Family code and identifier assignment for all 1-Wire devices rests Family code and identifier assignment for all 1-Wire devices rests
with the manufacturers. with the manufacturers.
4.3. Organization-Defined Identifiers 4.3. Organization-Defined Identifiers
Device identifiers that have only a meaning within an organization Device identifiers that have only a meaning within an organization
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6.1. Privacy 6.1. Privacy
Other devices in the same network may or may not be able to identify Other devices in the same network may or may not be able to identify
the device. For instance, on an Ethernet network, the MAC address of the device. For instance, on an Ethernet network, the MAC address of
a device is visible to all other devices. a device is visible to all other devices.
DEV URNs often represent long-term stable unique identifiers for DEV URNs often represent long-term stable unique identifiers for
devices. Such identifiers may have privacy and security implications devices. Such identifiers may have privacy and security implications
because they may enable correlating information about a specific because they may enable correlating information about a specific
device over a long period of time, location tracking, and device device over a long period of time, location tracking, and device
specific vulnerability exploitation [RFC7721]. Also, usually there specific vulnerability exploitation [RFC7721]. Also, in some systems
is no easy way to change the identifier. Therefore these identifiers there is no easy way to change the identifier. Therefore these
need to be used with care and especially care should be taken to identifiers need to be used with care and especially care should be
avoid leaking them outside of the system that is intended to use the taken to avoid leaking them outside of the system that is intended to
identifiers. use the identifiers.
6.2. Validity 6.2. Validity
Information about identifiers may have significant effects in some Information about identifiers may have significant effects in some
applications. For instance, in many sensor systems the identifier applications. For instance, in many sensor systems the identifier
information is used for deciding how to use the data carried in a information is used for deciding how to use the data carried in a
measurement report. On some other systems, identifiers may be used measurement report. On some other systems, identifiers may be used
in policy decisions. in policy decisions.
It is important that systems are designed to take into account the It is important that systems are designed to take into account the
possibility of devices reporting incorrect identifiers (either possibility of devices reporting incorrect identifiers (either
accidentally or maliciously) and the manipulation of identifiers in accidentally or maliciously) and the manipulation of identifiers in
communications by illegitimate entities on the path. Integrity communications by illegitimate entities. Integrity protection of
protection of communications or data objects, the use of trusted communications or data objects, the use of trusted devices, and
devices, and various management practices can help address these various management practices can help address these issues.
issues.
The advice from [RFC4122] Section 6 also applies: Do not assume that
DEV URNs are hard to guess.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document requests the registration of a new URN namespace for This document requests the registration of a new URN namespace for
"DEV", as described in Section 3. "DEV", as described in Section 3.
IANA is asked to create a "DEV URN Subtypes" registry. The initial IANA is asked to create a "DEV URN Subtypes" registry. The initial
values in this registry are as follows: values in this registry are as follows:
Subtype Description Reference Subtype Description Reference
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editor.org/info/rfc8464>. editor.org/info/rfc8464>.
[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
Amsuess, C., Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and P. Amsuess, C., Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and P.
Stok, "CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource- Stok, "CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-
directory-26 (work in progress), November 2020. directory-26 (work in progress), November 2020.
[LwM2M] "OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine Requirements", OMA [LwM2M] "OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine Requirements", OMA
Standard Candidate Version 1.2, January 2019. Standard Candidate Version 1.2, January 2019.
Appendix A. Changes from Previous Version Appendix A. Changes from Previous Versions
Editor's note: Please remove this section before publication. Editor's note: Please remove this section before publication.
Version -11 was created to address non-blocking comments from the
IESG review. This version made the following changes:
o Removed space after the "%s" in the ABNF RFC 7405 syntax.
o Softened and clarified the recommendation regarding UUIDs in
Section 1.
o Added a paragraph about the impacts of using randomized MAC
addresses.
o Added advice regarding ease of guessing DEV URNs, in Section 6.2.
o Simplified and clarified the "illegitimate entities" statement in
Section 6.2.
o Clarified the persistence statement in Section 3.3.
Version -10 made the following changes: Version -10 made the following changes:
o Restricted the case of "mac", "ow", etc. any subtype to lower o Restricted the case of "mac", "ow", etc. any subtype to lower
case. This required the adoption of RFC 7405 syntax in the ABNF. case. This required the adoption of RFC 7405 syntax in the ABNF.
o Added a reserved "example" subtype to be used in examples. o Added a reserved "example" subtype to be used in examples.
o Clarified global applicability, particularly in cases with local o Clarified global applicability, particularly in cases with local
or manual assignment mechanisms. or manual assignment mechanisms.
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Version -03 made several minor corrections to the ABNF as well as Version -03 made several minor corrections to the ABNF as well as
some editorial corrections. some editorial corrections.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Ari Keranen, Stephen Farrell, The authors would like to thank Ari Keranen, Stephen Farrell,
Christer Holmberg, Peter Saint-Andre, Wouter Cloetens, Jaime Jimenez, Christer Holmberg, Peter Saint-Andre, Wouter Cloetens, Jaime Jimenez,
Joseph Knapp, Padmakumar Subramani, Mert Ocak, Hannes Tschofenig, Jim Joseph Knapp, Padmakumar Subramani, Mert Ocak, Hannes Tschofenig, Jim
Schaad, Thomas Fossati, Carsten Bormann, Marco Tiloca, Barry Leiba, Schaad, Thomas Fossati, Carsten Bormann, Marco Tiloca, Barry Leiba,
Amanda Baber, Juha Hakala, Dale Worley, Brian Weis, John Klensin, Amanda Baber, Juha Hakala, Dale Worley, Warren Kumari, Benjamin
Dave Thaler, Russ Housley, Dan Romascanu, and Ahmad Muhanna for Kaduk, Brian Weis, John Klensin, Dave Thaler, Russ Housley, Dan
feedback and interesting discussions in this problem space. We would Romascanu, Eric Vyncke, Roman Danyliw, and Ahmad Muhanna for feedback
also like to note prior documents that focused on specific device and interesting discussions in this problem space. We would also
like to note prior documents that focused on specific device
identifiers, such as [RFC7254] or [RFC8464]. identifiers, such as [RFC7254] or [RFC8464].
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko Jari Arkko
Ericsson Ericsson
Jorvas 02420 Jorvas 02420
Finland Finland
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
Cullen Jennings Cullen Jennings
Cisco Cisco
170 West Tasman Drive 170 West Tasman Drive
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